SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNMENT PRACTICES COMMONLY USED BY BLADEX AND OTHER PUBLIC CORPORATIONS IN PANAMA, AS COMPARED TO THE STANDARDS DEFINED BY NYSE FOR LOCAL CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

Final NYSE Standard Section 303 A. 11:

"The foreign private corporations listed must disclose any significant information on the manner their corporate government practices differ from those observed by local corporations under NYSE standards."

1. FIRST DIFFERENCE: Corporate Government Committee of the Board of Directors

Final NYSE standard Section 303 A. 4. a) "The corporations listed must have a nomination/corporate government committee made up entirely of independent directors."

It is common practice among public corporations in Panama not to have a corporate government committee as the one defined by NYSE.

Bladex's position in this matter is the following:

- The Board of Directors has decided not to constitute a corporate government committee. Given the importance that this matter has for the Bank, it has decided to address all of the matters related to the Board of Directors in plenary meetings, and the Audit and Compliance Committee has been appointed to promote a continuous improvement in the Corporate Governance scheme of the Bank, and realize a follow-up to matters related to it in order to verify its adequate compliance.
2. SECOND DIFFERENCE: Need of approval from the shareholders in terms of all of the compensation plans based upon shares and for material revisions of said plans.

Final NYSE Standard Section 303 A. 8: *The approval of shareholders is necessary for all of the compensation plans based upon shares and for material revisions of said plans, subject to limited exceptions.*

Pursuant to Panamanian laws, any contracts, agreements and transactions between the Bank and one or more of its Directors or Officers, or corporations in which they are interested, may be approved by the Board of Directors. However, the Board must inform shareholders thereof in the next meeting. A meeting of shareholders may revoke the approval of the Board of Directors, and whenever convenient and there is adequate basis thereto, it may invoke the personal responsibility of Directors who gave a favorable vote to the resolution.

Given that any of the compensation plans in terms of shares (as well as any compensation plans in terms of cash) constitute agreements or transactions in which Directors show personal interest, they need the approval of the Board of Directors. However, they must be reported in the next meeting of shareholders.

Panamanian legislation differs in this point from NYSE standards in terms that it DOES NOT require that compensation plans concerning shares be previously approved by the shareholders in order to have validity, and only require further notice thereof.